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Abstract  
Functions or “functionings” enable to give a structure to any economic activity whether they are 
used to describe a good or a service that is exchanged on a market or they constitute the capability of an 
agent to provide the labor market with specific work and skills. That structure encompasses the basic law 
of supply and demand and the conditions of growth within a transaction and of the inflation control. 
Functional requirements can be followed from the design of a product to the delivery of a solution to a 
customer’s needs with different levels of externalities while value is created integrating organizational 
and technical constraints whereas a budget is allocated to the various entities of the firm involved in the 
production. Entering the market through that structure leads to designing basic equations of its dynamics 
and to finding canonical solutions out of particular equilibria. This approach enables to tackle behavioral 
foundations of Prospect Theory within a generalization of its probability weighting function turned into 
an operator which applies to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies as well as 
to the poorest ones. The nature of reality and well-being appears then as closely related to the relative 
satisfaction reached on the market, as it can be conceived by an agent, according to business cycles; this 
reality being the result of the complementary systems that govern human mind as structured by rational 
psychologists. 
JEL Codes: C65; D01; D51; D62; I31; O41.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The concept of ‘functionings’, which has distinctly Aristotelian roots, reflects the various 
things a person may value doing or being” (Sen 2001). This is the Sen’s side taken for the 
development of a functional economics. On the labor market both know-how and inter-personal 
skills may be valued by employers as well as by employees of any firm. The structuring of 
economic activities into functions enables to encompass “being” and “doing” in the same model: 
working is a means of gathering both notions that provide any agent with the position he or she 
deserves among the other workers of a community. Beyond decision-making which is 
instantaneous, although it has to be prepared and it can lead to long-lasting activities, action 
always comes within a time evolution: for instance in physics it is the product of energy or work 
by the duration of the measured process. So time must be introduced as the money standard 
which applies to economic efficiency measurement whatever the currencies that are used by the 
firms on the markets. 
Time resource is scarce especially when an agent grows old what often goes with higher 
responsibilities and thus a transition from action to decision-making. According to Sen a 
“person’s capability refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for 
her to achieve” and to a certain extent such capability increases also with experience while an 
agent gets over the steps of that transition. Eventually this analysis can be applied within a 
formalism showing the intricacy of capability and time for the definition of work utility. 
This work utility can be represented as a curve but it has no known origin or rather its 
beginning is lost in the course of evolution. So as to use it the economist has to “climb on the 
bandwagon” and fix a point that will be the origin of his study. Hidden in this representation lies 
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the notion of gauge, in terms of which economic phenomena can be analyzed. Finding a 
reference point introduces behavioral principles and in particular the one of the framing effect of 
the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Within a given frame, work utilities can be 
exploited to go deeper into the basic law of supply and demand which assumes a vast number of 
equilibria under its functional form (Chauvet 2013). A fine study can show the high degree of 
interdependence of the agents that are involved in a transaction or an exchange, those agents 
often being contractually bound. The “buy and forget” behavior is no longer appropriate when a 
complex purchase is made which requires a learning period and the resort to a support from the 
supplier or a skilled subcontractor. Moreover this period and the efficiency of the support prove 
to be necessary conditions for a global growth within the finest framework of the law of supply 
and demand. The relation between this microeconomic principle of growth and inflation can then 
be emphasized. 
Going deeper into the functional structure of the prospects of a project and refining the 
concept of payoff – as the ratio of the adaptive utility to the capability of agents – allow a 
rational point of view resorting neither to currencies nor to a complex game theory. But this 
payoff relying on adaptive utility applies essentially to marketing whereas value is built along 
with the creation of effective functions within a project intended to design, develop and provide a 
given contractual customer with a solution, or to launch a product, good or service on a specific 
market. These functions are associated with energies and physical work. 
So functionings and functions show a notional continuity from work or energy provided by 
workers or by means of production and eventually developed by products, to a strategic adaptive 
utility which is used by market makers as a means of gathering in the same functional concept all 
the cognitive charge in relation with the various aspects of the firm management and of its goods 
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or services marketing. Although work and energy, on the one hand, and adaptive utility, on the 
other hand, may be distinguished analytically, both notions can find an economic interest in 
being unified and identified one to the other in some circumstances. Such interest appears clearly 
for projects which are highly visible from the hierarchy of the firm. Anticipating their success, 
the associated value is seen as the aggregation of the ones of each developed function. The use of 
the capacity formalism (Choquet 1954) according to the Prospect Theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) enables to refine the expression of this value within the valorization of 
outcomes – energy or work – under organizational and technical constraints of profitability. 
These constraints can be shown as the origin of the relation between inflation and unemployment 
as noticed Phillips (1958) through an empirical study. 
Whether it comes from a bid process in order to win a contract for the achievement of a 
project for a customer or it consists of an investment of the firm to produce a good or service for 
the mass consumption, a budget must be drawn up which relies on the human and skills capital 
of the company and on the information required to manage the project. The complexity of 
industrial arrangements can be described through matrix formalism, from the tenderer’s 
submission and anticipated design and architecture of the solution proposed to the customer, to 
its delivery after completion in spite of possible unexpected externalities. 
Once established the industrial processes and organization for providing the customers with 
solutions to contractual requirements or with goods and services, the market dynamics can be 
studied for a supply policy, respectively for the demand, through two fundamental equations 
taking account of the framing approach. Particular situations can be described: pure speculation 
when no value is exchanged on the market but which characterizes innovative ideas including 
negative externalities processing; equilibrium when the payoff function is constant; and the 
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general case according to which the solutions of the market dynamics equations show similarities 
while choosing constraints on their parameters. This choice based on maturity and complexity or 
capacity binding leads to defining general conditions for exchanges to be possible. 
These conditions introduced in the behavioral model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
enable to widen their fourfold pattern of decision under risk – initially applicable to money 
managers and graduate students from great American universities – to the perception of markets 
the consequence of which is a specific behavior according to business cycles. The initial 
application of the fourfold pattern has been mainly exploited within Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies and it has been shown (Henrich, Heine 
and Norenzayan 2010) that generalizing about humans from WEIRD behavioral standards is a 
real bias that deserves a particular attention. So in search of universality, the initial pattern can be 
extended to poor economics (Banerjee and Duflo 2012) in using the probability weighting 
function of Tversky and Kahneman as an operator for behavioral analysis and for the 
determination of the conditions of well-being according to the concept of market from which 
reality appears as a mental equilibrium induced by the functioning of the two systems which 
enable the description of the human mind (Kahneman 2011). 
II. STANDARD LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
II.A. Work Duration as a Money Standard 
Let   be a work duration that can find a meaning in terms of money through the notions 
of wage or hourly rate. Then   can be considered as the analog of a cardinal measure of the 
utility of a work when it can be admitted that the corresponding activity has a real economic 
value through functionings or functions creation. Such a measure can also be understood as a 
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way for an agent to be active on markets: on the labor market when he or she produces goods 
and services under the brand name of a firm or as a self-employed worker; on the markets of all 
kinds of products where he or she has to buy so as to satisfy his or her needs for food, 
transportation, lodging, entertainment and so on. In order to avoid any misuse of existing 
meanings relying on a vast amount of works on the principle of cardinal utility,   is named 
“time cost” while a salaried employment is a means of paying and enjoying all what life can 
offer. 
As a builder of goods and services, the agent provides functions that are directly or 
indirectly used for the production of increasing complexity products, those functions relying also 
on raw materials that must be converted and on machines and tools which enable the creation of 
value thanks to high skilled workers. Those functions are “priced” as shown in figure 1. The 
“price” of the function mf  which is found between i  and j  depends on the practices of its 
provider. 
 
Figure 1 – Function pricing 
II.B. Functional Capability and Work Utility 
But the skills which are developed by the agent are not even among a population of 
workers and it is necessary to introduce a means of making a distinction between their 
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capabilities, as the ordinal utility enables to distinguish relative perceived values by an order of 
preference. Thus, a capability can be established as the ratio of the variation of m , the number of 
provided functions plunged into the set of real numbers, to the variation of the work duration: the 
greater the ratio, the higher the functional capability C . The global work utility is then: 
(1) u
dm
W C
d
 

     
Hence there are two ways to compare work powers as there are two ways to structure 
utility: the cardinal one   that gives a measurable scale and the ordinal one which is the 
derivative of m  according to   and enables also to take into account preferences. Those 
preferences are based on decisions about which functional practices are selected through the 
work utility estimate. 
II.C. Supply and Demand Within the Framing Effects 
The work product, in functional terms, corresponds to the function segments crossed by 
the work utility curve which is linear in a first approximation due to a framing effect (figure 2). 
The number of functions selected in that way – according to preference of practices – is the 
complexity (c) of the work product. As it can be considered as a supply (s) or as a demand (d), it 
seems relevant to distinguish two complexities, one for each economic prospect that is 
conceivable on a market. The work utilities are such that: 
(2) ;us s s ud d d
s d
dm dm
W c W c
d d
 
 
    
        
    
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The figure 2 shows how to understand the two kinds of work utilities and their connection 
with the functional complexity of the work product that is supposed to be exchanged in the frame 
of the supply and demand but it does not provide the way how the exchange price is fixed. 
 
Figure 2 – Work utility within a specific frame 
In this figure 2, both behaviors of supply and of demand are presented simultaneously but 
it must be clear that each linear approximation is performed by a different agent although 
exchanges may take place between entities belonging to the same organization or firm. 
In a more complex model, the work utility is not linear and can globally involve phases 
when the agent is a provider of function and others when he or she is a consumer. The same kind 
of behavior must be understandable also for a firm which has suppliers and customers. 
The figure 3 sets out different frames of study that illustrate how the framing effect can be 
understood. The global one  , ,O m   shows the full work utility curve while the frame centered 
on O’ presents a section of the curve where the linear approximation applies in a phase of 
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demand and the frame centered on O’’ shows another part where the same kind of approximation 
also applies in a phase of supply. 
 
Figure 3 – Global work utility curve of an agent 
In the global framework, the function mf  is firstly bought at a “price” ' , is then 
enhanced, integrated in a product or simply resold under the brand name of the buyer at a price 
''  after value has been added concretely or by the simple fact that a name may have a 
reputation which deserves a margin that is worth a higher level of warranty. 
II.D. Supply and Demand and Capital as a Framework 
Applying a financial reasoning leads to linking capital and work utility while admitting 
that all elementary functions are realized – designed and prepared in an intellectual way and then 
industrialized – or performed more concretely at the same “time cost”. The capital K can be 
written: 
(3) K m    
So after differentiation: 
(4) dK dm md      
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and according to the expressions of the work utilities: 
(5)  
dm dK
m c
d d

 
       
After integration – of the work utility – for the supply with Os as the reference point: 
(6) exp s Oss Os
s Os
m m
c c
 
 
  
 
   
and for the demand: 
(7) exp Od dd Od
Od d
m m
c c
 
 
  
 
   
 
Figure 4 – Supply and demand curves 
These last results have already been established by Chauvet (2013) for an explanation of 
the law of functional supply and demand as illustrated by the figure 4. 
From the viewpoint of the capital, it can be added for the supply that: 
(8) ln 1s s Oss
s Os Os
dK m
c
d c

 
  
    
  
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(9) ln s Oss s s Os
Os Os
m
K c K
c



 
   
 
   
And for the demand, the capital follows the law: 
(10) lnOd dd d d Od
Od Od
m
K c K
c



 
   
 
   
Thus, when the exchange takes place and when there is an agreement on the price, the global 
capital is: 
(11)  
, *d s
d sK K K        
(12) 
 ,
*
* ln
*
s d
c c
Od s d
Os Od O s d
Os Os Od
c c
K m m K
c c


 
     
              
   
II.E. Conditions of growth 
In the simple case where the complexity imagined by the buyer is equal to the complexity 
designed and developed by the provider, there comes: 
(13)  , * ln
Od Os Od
O s d
Os Os Od
m m
K K K c
c c



  
       
  
   
The global capital of the buyer and of the seller increases whenever this condition is verified: 
(14) expOd Os Od
Os Os Od
m m
r
c c


 
    
 
   
This capital growth depends naturally on the complexity and on the cost – or work time cost – 
and then on the price of the product that is exchanged but also essentially on the frame, the 
references of which are the points Os and Od. 
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In the light of the equilibrium      , , *,s s d dc c c     the ratio r is the opportunity for 
bargaining the conditions of delivery of the product that will be exchanged between the supplier 
and the buyer: those conditions consist essentially in the level of support that will be provided for 
enabling the takeover of the product after the purchase. The support duration is generally 
included in the offer but the buyer often forgets that he or she will also spend more or less time 
on appealing to it. This bargaining depends on the past experiences of both the supplier and the 
customer but may not be fully appropriate to the new situation: although the takeover has been 
prepared, the transition which characterizes the exchange is always surrounded with a 
considerable degree of uncertainty. 
When both supply and demand of the references are saturated,    , ,Os Od Os Odc c m m ,  
the capital growth is positive if the time cost invested by the demand is more than r = 13.5% of 
the one paid to the supply. 
(15) 13.5Od u Od Od
Os u Os Os
t t
r
t t
 
 
       
In other terms for the growth to be positive, under the hypothesis of a uniform cost u , when an 
agent buys a good or a service he or she must accept to spend on the takeover of his purchase 
more than 13.5% of the time used by the seller for the production and the distribution of the good 
or service. 
Out of saturation, Os Osc m , the supplier selected a restricted number of functions for the 
production and distribution; or Od Odc m , the buyer focused his or her purchase only on the 
functions he or she needs; the ratio of time costs is reduced for several reasons: the supplier 
specialized and the buyer paid only for what he was in need of. As a consequence, the condition 
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of growth corresponds to a lower ratio r and the required time spent on the takeover is relatively 
shorter thanks to a better fit. 
Both conditions Os Osc m  and Od Odc m  mean that the reference points have been 
reached while the numbers of functions supplied Osm  and bought Odm  were above the respective 
complexities to which the supplier and his or her customer have paid a particular attention. It 
follows that, r being constant, the growth is all the more important since the gap – between the 
number of functions of a product and its perceived complexity – is large: generally when 
someone buys a complex system, a car for instance, he or she often does not mind all the vast 
number of technical functions which contribute to the few basic functions that are eventually 
required for a relatively easy use. So an efficient complexity management is also a means of 
generating growth. 
However this growth relies on information: a better knowledge of the markets or of the 
functions available for production or for consumption but also Big Data analysis or analytics and 
processing tools in order to create Artificial Intelligence for complexity management. 
Within industrial exchanges of complex systems or machine tools delivered to firms or 
factories for their production lines, the cases Os Osc m  and Od Odc m  can appear when the 
numbers of functions supplied Osm  and bought Odm  hide the real complexities that must be taken 
in charge. Actually these functions show decompositions into sub-functions the control of which 
is decisive for a system takeover and operation and requires high-skilled and trained workers. In 
these cases, the ratio r of the required time costs – for the growth to be possible – increases with 
the complexities showing how much a firm can be dependent upon the systems, the 
corresponding training and support it has been provided with and upon its providers, 
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subcontractors or industrial partners: the time [cost] that must be spent by the purchaser for the 
takeover is relatively high in comparison with the time spent by the provider for the production 
of the purchase. The explanation is that the customer has gone through a long process of 
specification of requirements prior to this production and that he or she needs training and 
support for the use of the resulting complex system. 
Considering the labor market and a kind of standardization of the time costs for given 
employments and skills, whatever the business involved in the race for a global capital growth, 
this one is all the greater since r is large in comparison with the exponential term. This expresses 
the fact that the higher the relative level of skill of the demand, the less training is needed for the 
purchase takeover. Furthermore the capital which increases all the more so since c  is great 
shows that growth is accelerated by an increase in complexity or in time cost or in both. 
II.F. Global capital growth and inflation 
For the global capital to grow within an exchange some conditions on the reference frames 
must be realized. Among others, a deeper study of the constraint on the ratio r enables to 
understand the origin of the inflation – or of the deflation – related to an “ex ante” increase of 
complexity: when Osm  and Odm  are kept constant while Osc  and/or Odc  rise, r also increases 
what induces that Od  gets greater or Os  diminishes or both, the most probable being that Os   
stays constant or grows less than Od . Thus logically an increasing complexity should lead at 
first to a marked increase in the time cost of the demand and through the adjustment of salaries in 
a given economic sector, to a global inflation in this sector: when the perceived complexities 
decrease, because of and after a rise in competence on the corresponding range of products, the 
constraint on r is relaxed what implies that Os  can in turn increase more than Od . This 
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reasoning relies essentially on the evolution and learning of practices, the complexity of which 
depends on its perception [on the market] and so on cognitive criteria: once a practice is well 
understood and widespread it can become a standard of work and behavior. Thus change driven 
by innovation to temporarily higher perceived complexity is necessary for a sustainable 
economic growth. 
If such a standard is not challenged by changes to a higher complexity, it can lead to 
deflation: the demand would have no reason to replace its practices or its assets with equivalent 
ones of flat perceived complexity characterizing a low innovation context, so Od  would 
decrease until the ratio r reaches its constraint level and below, Os  must be reduced in order to 
maintain a reasonable growth. Then a solution to avoid deflation at a microeconomic level is 
planned obsolescence which sustains the demand for replacement of goods and services within 
this low innovation context. 
When Osm  and/or Odm   increase while a higher level of complexity is developed through 
innovation, the ratio r can also decrease according to a lower constraint leading to time costs 
reductions in some circumstances of disinflation when the innovation enables productivity gains. 
But this decrease in r can also lead to greater time costs when this innovation goes with its 
widespread use thanks to a great deal of consumers or suppliers willing to adopt new standards 
and behaviors. 
III. PAYOFF AND VALUE 
Let F  be a set of all the conceivable functions in a given field of economic activities: 
(16)  
1 F
i i m
F f
 
    
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with Fm  the cardinality of F . This set constitutes a strategy for some marketing purpose. As 
designed, each of its functions is supposed to develop the energy or work or adaptive utility iE  
(Chauvet 2013). More precisely, F  is also written: 
(17)    
1 1s d
s d
s d i ii m i m
F F F f f
        
     
The set sF  represents the functions that the firm is ready to supply and dF , the functions that the 
customers are waiting for, such that s dF F  . sm    and dm   , are the ceiling functions 
respectively of sm  and dm . 
On the one hand, F  can be reached through the market analysis and studied theoretically 
in universities or schools and also by professionals who have to maintain a high level of 
knowledge required to manage the evolution of their practices in relation with more technical 
teams of skilled workers and colleagues. They also need F  for reporting to their superiors who 
appreciate understanding simply the way how their business grows, when it grows on a market 
segment, or the reason why a strategy does not fit the requirements of their prospective 
customers. 
On the other hand, F  has to be regularly “tuned” according to the physical, technical and 
economic constraints that must be taken into account for the development of products or services 
according to another set RF : 
(18)  
1 R
R i i m
F g
 
    
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This set is made up of all the functions that are really performed by the solutions brought to the 
market by a firm through a project S . Each function of this set yields the outcome 
R
iE  which can 
be considered as a work (or energy). 
III.A. The Payoff 
The payoff function can then be defined as: 
(19) 
1
1 i m
i
i
P E
C


     
where ,s dC C C ,  ,s dm m m        and ,
s d
i i iE E E  whether P  is written for the supply or for 
the demand. This definition expresses the fact that the payoff to a firm is proportional to the 
adaptive utility or effective work developed by its employees but in inverse proportion to their 
capability needed to develop such a utility. As asserted by Chauvet (2013) the capability is also 
an indirect measure of the uncertainty, hence its converse is a characterization of the certainty 
and the payoff is all the more important since the certainty of the outcomes iE ’s is great and 
gives strength to a strategy. In other caricatured words the firm functioning requires employees 
“who do the job” with the just necessary capabilities and the ability to find certainties, at least 
temporarily for the success of a project. 
III.B. Project, Outcomes and Organization 
After Tversky and Kahneman (1992), let S  be a finite set of states of a project led by a 
firm, the subsets of which are known as events and let E  be a set of outcomes that can be 
positive or negative – gains or losses – and not only monetary outcomes. An “uncertain” 
prospect g  is a function from S  into E  such that: 
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(20)   ,s S g s E        
The outcomes of g  are arranged in increasing order in such a way that for  jA  a partition of S , 
the prospect is a sequence of pairs  ,j jA   such that g  yields j  when the event jA  occurs. 
Applying the formalism of Tversky and Kahneman, the value associated with g  is: 
(21)    
j n
j j
j m
V g v 


     
where v  is the way how an outcome is valued and j  is computed according to the concept of 
capacity W  (Choquet 1954) which generalizes the standard notion of probability on a set of 
events:   0W   ,   1W S   and    k jW A W A  whenever k jA A S  . 
Here is considered a real event A  concerning all the agents committed to producing the 
set of functions RF  in the framework of the project: each ig , as a service, is performed through 
the collaboration of agents of the firm, according to events, or as a good, it provides a 
functionality used by the consumer, customer of the firm. For the whole project, as it is a 
collective work, A S  and the associated value is: 
(22)    , ,
1 1
R Rm m j n
i i j i j
i i j m
V V g v 

  
      
where 0n m   and  ,0i W S   at the “granularity” of the project. Then:  
(23)      
1 1
R Rm m
R R
i i
i i
V W S v E v E
 
      
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III.C. Project Within the Organization of the Firm and Value 
Nevertheless contributions inside or outside the firm can be distinguished. The project S  
is a collaborative work of departments D  of the firm and each department shares a part of the 
events that drive it. When it is driven by a market or an innovation strategy, the design of a 
product relies on the functions if ’s. Thus for this given project it is possible to consider  D  as 
a partition of S  while each function or prospect if  is associated with the subsets or events  ,i jA
which form another partition of S . The outcome of if  when the event ,i jA  occurs is ,i j , a 
technical component that is necessary to produce the good or service made up with the functions 
ig ’s, target of the project, according to the state of the art on the market. For the considered firm, 
processes and practices are such that ,i jA  is adapted to its organization: 
(24) , ,i j i jA A D

    
The firm may have to use a subcontractor to get the component ,i j or to buy it on the market in 
order to build its good or service but this specific component is adapted and integrated by the 
departments of the firm. For the whole if  it is possible to define iA
 the contribution of a given 
department to the production of all the components needed for this function: 
(25)  , ,i i j i j
j j
A A D A       
The global contribution of the departments to if  is then: 
(26) iA


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The whole contribution of the firm’s organization in terms of events through the project S  is 
then: 
(27) 
1
Fm
i
i
A

 
 
 
   
In the case of additivity of the capacities relatively to the functional structure of the product 
yielded by the project: 
(28) 
11
F Fm m
i i
ii
W A W A 
 
    
    
    
    
And when the contributions of the departments D  to the project S are also additive: 
(29)  
1 1
F Fm m
i i
i i
W A W A 
 
 
 
 
     
Founded on a popular belief, the initiation of the project is attributed to a visionary firm 
leader, whether someone who has seminal ideas or who knows how to federate teams of creative 
people. In both cases this initiation relies on the combinatorics of all what is possible for a start-
up which will “scale fast” or for a major company already having a great organization and a 
substantial portfolio of profitable projects. The complexity managed, virtually through an 
intuition, a reliable business plan and a strong financial support for a start-up, or concretely for a 
powerful and well established firm, can be assessed as being the organizational cumulative 
capacity: 
(30)  ,
1
Fm
org i j
i j
c W A

    
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The nature of the contributions and of the functional or technical structures relatively to 
the capacities W , sub-additive, additive or super-additive, depends on the organization, its 
synergies and on the practices of the firm. This nature can be analyzed in order to improve 
margins between the costs or expenses of the project and its profit when its products are 
delivered to the customers of the firm. 
After a combinatorial reduction of the contributions to the technical components of the 
prospective solution, it appears that these components can be mutualized and reduced to the set 
 k   with  techc card  , the number of the components of  . A constraint of 
profitability can then be written: 
(31) 
org
tech
c
c
c
 
  
 
   
Finally, the notion of function is polymorphous and emerges from the diverse concepts 
used by the multiplicity of contributors of a project to describe a technical system. The work 
utility uW C c  , as stated previously, gives pieces of information not only on the complexity 
involved in the supply or in the demand but also about c  understood as the ratio of the 
cumulative capacity of all the contributors to the number of mutualized technical components, 
necessary for the production of goods or services provided by the firm according to the project 
characterized by S . The capacity then appears as the product of a capability by a time cost and 
by an indicator measuring a technical core. It can also be suggested that the global capacity is a 
measure of the monetary – proportional to   – motivation of the teams mobilized in the 
processes of the firm within a project. The “pernicious” effect of this conclusion is that fixing a 
constraint of profitability implies also selecting rigorously the project team members in such a 
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way that the complexity will be managed without needless – although motivated – participants. 
Following the constraint applied to the ratio r – for a global growth to be possible – and 
according to the new meaning of c, it appears that for a given technical core, an uncontrolled 
increase in orgc  can lead to inflation. So fixing a constraint of profitability enables to master the 
right level of inflation compatible with a sustainable growth, in spite of the consequences on the 
unemployment: when orgc  is low, less workers are needed to perform less work events of the 
project.  
At the beginning of the project, the organizational structure is defined for its realization 
and a costing is worked out while the project team is selected and involved or hired. Generally 
the more the amount of contributions is important, the less the outcomes of the functions, that are 
really produced, are valued or the less the profit. On the other hand, the set of technical 
components   cannot be reduced or if it is, that would lead to a loss of value, the final product 
being incomplete compared with what it was expected to be. As a consequence, the value of the 
outcome RiE  is expressed by: 
(32)  
1R R
i iv E E
c
    
The deviation from linearity is due to the ratio of the time cost to the cumulative capacity 
and may obey the law of diminishing returns to the contributors (part B of the figure 5), like the 
value of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) verifies the principle of diminishing 
sensitivity. 
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Figure 5 – Diminishing returns 
When 0RiE  , the corresponding function constitutes a negative externality and the slope 
of the value is stiffer (part A of the figure 5) because of the need of a higher time cost to 
remunerate a small number of experts – such that orgc  is also low – capable of reducing this 
negative externality. Within the investigations of those experts, the methods of reduction being 
specified, the greater the absolute value of RiE , the more skilled contributors must be involved to 
mitigate the negative externality: orgc  increases whereas the time cost is still limited (part B’ of 
the figure 5). The value produced by the firm, to which is given a concrete expression by a 
product, is then written: 
(33) 
1
1 R
i m
R
i
i
V E
c



     
This expression also accounts for the search for simplicity – less people (low orgc ) to 
manage a greater number of technical components (high techc ) – which is more valued than 
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complexity of use of a product and value is naturally in direct proportion to the work and its 
duration necessary to produce a given good or service. Another alternative reasoning based on 
the Prospect Theory gives an explanation on how the value v  can be assessed (Chauvet 2015) 
through an operational optimization which is fostered as a best practice – for profitability – in the 
firm. 
According to the maturity of the marketing or innovation strategy, F  and RF  are close 
one to the other – especially in an agile project – the latter being built from the technical 
components yielded upon the design and developments performed through the former 
enforcement. 
Whether it is for the firm a matter of time to market or of compliance with the schedule of a 
contract, the value produced by a planned project decreases when the availability of the technical 
components is not obtained within the schedule. This aspect of a project requires distinguishing 
the contractual framework from the technical facts: the technical course can lead to a successful 
product although contractual milestones are not gone through as planned in agreement with the 
customer or as anticipated for a timely introduction on a market. So a project may be a technical 
success while it is financially in deficit: the mechanisms of penalty within a contract and of 
competition on the market imply that the final value of the product is the one of the technical 
solution reduced drastically by penalties or by the presence of competitors on the target market. 
IV. INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES UNDER ESTIMATES 
The industrial processes enable to turn F  into RF , the former characterizing mainly the 
customer’s expectation and the latter is the functional basis for the validation of the customer’s 
satisfaction. This validation is formal and relies on tests performed by the provider of the set RF  
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in order to make sure the corresponding product can be delivered to the market or to a 
contractual customer. In this last case the final acceptance test and report is generally required to 
make sure that the contract has been respected. The delivery must occur according to the 
contractual schedule. Should the good or service, in part or entirely, be delivered beyond the 
scheduled date of delivery, some penalties can be applied to its provider. 
In this paragraph the estimates practiced by the industrial providers show that the initial 
evaluation is high enough to take into account the main unknown factors conceivable by any 
contract expert and corporate lawyer. So it is assumed that any risk involving penalties is 
covered within the estimates or that the industrial providers have underestimated the expectations 
of the customer and must be ready to be in deficit for the corresponding contract. 
Thus, in what follows, a great effort is made to technically ensure the delivery of what is 
contractually expected even if it means reducing any uncertainty while selecting the operating 
modes, the most efficient ones, of the chosen technical components of the delivered solution. 
The logic of the following sub-sections is turned towards the customer’s satisfaction and, 
with the appropriate means, towards a profitable activity within a budget shared between firms, 
then inside a firm between entities, each level of budget allocation being an opportunity of 
creating value while reducing costs. Margins appear naturally with the uncertainty management. 
IV.A. From Architecture and Design to an Industrial Arrangement 
At the bid or anticipated design stage of the project the set F  is figured out in a dynamical 
way according to scenarios of use under budget constraints. An implicit simulation can be 
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formalized by the following doubly stochastic matrix FM  which characterizes the probability 
,i j  for the function if  to activate [or interact with] the function jf : 
(34) 
, , ,1 ,
1 1
, 1, 1
F F
F
m m
F i j i j i ji j m
i j
M   
 
 
          
At this stage based on previous projects or on functional concepts ,i j  are still vague in the 
minds of the stakeholders but according to the theorem of Birkhoff (1946) – von Neumann 
(1953), FM  can be decomposed into permutation matrices  such that: 
(35) , 1 ,
, 1, 0,
F
F i j i j m
M W W W     
 

 
             
This decomposition depends on the [know-how of the] firms and on their target customers and so 
is absolutely not unique but by the enforcement of a future contract, it would be the basis of a 
singular relation. 
The architecture put forward by the bidders relies on this decomposition, each weighting 
W  standing for the influence of the architect   – one of the max  architects involved in the 
architecture construction – on the design of the solution proposed to the customer or designed for 
a given market. An example of permutation matrix   is shown below (only one 1 in any row 
and only one 1 in any column). 
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(36) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
f f f f f f f
f
f
f
f
f
f
f

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
The order of the activations is the following (according to two cycles 
k
 ’s): 
(37) 
 
 
1
1 2 4 3 6 1
2
5 7 5
: ...
: ...
f f f f f f
f f f




    
 
   
All the uncertainty of FM is transferred to the architects of the solution through the 
weightings W ’s while the permutation matrix of each architect characterizes the certainty to get 
a defined piece of solution. 
Let the costing operator be  1 2, ,..., FmE diag E E E  identified through a professional 
cost estimate in terms of work necessary for the solution to be realized. Here, the work E  
integrates the unitary or normalized to 1 time cost. Let the information operator be 
 1 2, ,..., FmI diag I I I  which is the result of analyses of the state of the art for the solution 
construction. The bid estimate is based on the matrix FB EM I  and a Rough Order of 
Magnitude (ROM) is drawn up within an interval which is sometimes defined by the customer 
and according to the following mechanism, where I  and PE characterize respectively the best 
knowledge and the highest level of professionalism of the field of the solution: 
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(38) 
, ,
1 1
, ,
1 1
,
,
F F
F F
m m
i i j j i i j j i
j j
m m
i i j j j i i j j P
i i
E I E I E I i
E I I E I E j
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
and 
(39)    PI Tr E ROM E Tr I      
the knowledge I  and the professionalism PE  being such that: 
(40)    , PI Tr I Tr E E      
These conditions account for the fact that the best knowledge is always challenged by a new 
project which is an opportunity to generate new concepts and the result of a specific reflection, 
whereas the highest level of professionalism drives the project above the work [cost] estimate, 
especially when the management, under the customers’ pressure, leads its collaborators to excel 
themselves. 
Applying the E  and I operators to each component   ( , 1 , Fi j i j m

   
     ) of the 
decomposition of FM : 
(41) 
,
1
,
1
!
!
F
i
F
j
m
i i i j j i k i
j
m
j i i j j l j P j
i
i k E I E I E I
j l E I E I E I
 

 




   
   


   
The   estimate [of the necessary budget] b  provided by the corresponding architect satisfies: 
(42) 
1 1
F F
j i
m m
l j i k
j i
b E I E I
 
      
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It is possible to specify mathematically – what is not developed here – a lower bound and an 
upper bound to all b ’s, according to the rearrangement inequality (Hardy, Littlewood and Polya 
1952) applied to the series of eigenvalues of E  and I . At the bid stage, only positive 
eigenvalues are considered. 
The singular case max 1   when 1FM   entails  
1 min i
i
I I  ,  
1 maxP i
i
E E  and 
eventually: 
(43)    1 11 PI Tr E b E Tr I      
For this singular case the upper bound to 1PE  can be lower than  Tr E  what confirms that a 
quick agreement between the customer and a preselected solution provider can lead to lower 
financial charges but without the guarantee of the best competitive professionalism. The lower 
bound to 1I  is far less than  Tr I  what shows that the selected firm has to create more 
information than available on the market or than the inputs from the customer. 
For the general case, max 1  , the lower and the upper bounds to b  are specific and, 
beyond the combinatorial aspects, imposed by the firms’ budget and prospect: 
(44) b b b  
      
Thresholds can then be defined: 
(45) ,
b W b W
W W
b b
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
and a weighted mean is: 
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(46) 
b W
W
b
 



 


   
When max 1  , the negotiations between the firm and the customer are led by mutual agreement, 
whereas in the general case the agreement is the result of a competitive process in which there 
can be a competition – sometimes a collaborative one – between the architects or designers 
inside a firm or between tenderers within the framework of an invitation to bid. In some complex 
situations the customer can also push several complementary firms to cooperate for a given 
contract whereas other kinds of cooperation are motivated by a market and the related prospects. 
Whatever the industrial and financial set-up competitiveness can be summed-up through the 
following diagram. 
 
Figure 6 – Selection of solution components 
The selection of the most influential architect or designer  W W   may be detrimental 
to the profitability of the project particularly if it is associated with a high budget requirement: 
the greater the value of b W  , the higher the contribution to W
  and so the weighted mean is 
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pulled to the top sometimes only by a few designers, if not a single one, who promote expensive 
solutions. At the opposite, low values of b W   pull W
 towards the bottom and provide low 
attractiveness solutions. 
When b  is low and W  is great, the corresponding solution is optimized and also 
attractively presented, whereas if b  is high and W  low, this case characterizes a high budget 
solution put forward by a low credibility designer. 
This classification does not provide any certainty for a selection decision but makes 
clearer the ambiguity in the selection process which relies much on the feeling of making a real 
bargain when choosing a project manager. But above all such a feeling relies on concrete 
elements: the reputation of the chosen firm based on the quality of its make and the clearest 
possible sight on its sustainability or its compliance to standards that is compatible with 
maintaining the solution at the expected level of use for a time length in adequacy with the 
customer profitability objectives. 
In some circumstances contenders embody their own standards while they influence the 
evolution of the state of the art in prescriptive organizations up to government ones and to world 
authorities. In this case the selection is highly economic, not to say political when customers are 
institutions such as ministries or governments. The whole economy of a country, or of a group of 
countries, can then be concerned. 
In front of the choice after application of selection criteria and according to the stakes of a 
market, a customer can decide to select several pieces of solution  . Let  k
k 
   be the set 
of the cycles associated with the permutation matrix  . According to the purpose, calculation 
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and “feeling” of the customer, the choice consists in selecting the right architects or designers   
who support the corresponding solutions. Logically the influence magnitudes W ’s crystallize an 
assessment of these solutions: excellent  W W  , attractive  W W W    and 
unsatisfactory  W W  . 
However this article does not go beyond this theoretical assessment, the truth in decision-
making being that it belongs to decision-makers. In other terms any speculation on a way for a 
customer to choose a contractor would be a pure intellectual and speculative bubble. So it is 
supposed that a decision is made and that the choice of the customer falls on a given set  of 
's . The matrix ,i jM 


     is then made up with the superposition of all the cycles 
k
 ’s 
elaborated for all the selected solutions  ’s: 
(47) 
, ,
, ,
1 | 1
0 0
i j i j
i j i j
iff
iff


  
  


   
   
   
By construction of the ROM and of M , the industrial set-up required by the customer 
involves a financial assessment which is still between the initial lower and upper bounds of the 
ROM (according to B EM I  ) but the arrangement imposed by the customer can generate 
synergies which may reduce costs or lead to extra expenditures for coordination need. So the 
cumulative contribution of  ’s is planned as being within the ROM estimate. 
IV.B. The Industrialization of a Solution by a Unique Contractor 
Each function if  uses the set of technical components  , ji i j   according to the events 
 , jiA . 
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The industrialization of the solution   is embodied in the solution matrix built from   
where each 1 is replaced by the matrix 
,i lT
  of technical components interaction while each 0 is 
replaced by the null matrix. The example of   leads to considering the following doubly 
stochastic matrix 
  in which each block matrix 
, , 1 , l
i l k j k j d
T t

 
 
     is also bistochastic in order 
to characterize the probability for each component  , 1,2,...,i j lj d    to activate [or interact 
with] any other technical component used to perform if . 
(48) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21,2
42,4
63,6
4,3 3
5,7 7
6,1 1
7,5 5
0 00 0 0 0
0 00 0 00
0 00 0 00
00 0 0 00
00 0 00 0
00 0 00 0
0 0 0 00 0
d d d d d d d
dT
dT
dT
T d
T d
T d
T d
      



 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
The order N  of 
  is the sum of the orders of the 
,i lT
 ’s: 
1
Fm
l
l
N d 

 . The initial 
costing operator E  is split according to the vertical partition of the orders while the information 
operator I is split according to the horizontal partition of the orders (below, the case of the 
example): 
(49) 
52 4 6
1 2 3
71 2
1 2
1,1 2,1 3,11, 2, 3, 7,
1,1 2,11, 2, 7,
,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,...
,..., , ,..., ,...
d d d d
E E E
d d d
I I
E diag E E E E E E E
I diag I I I I I
   
  
      

    



 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
34 
In the example: 
(50) 
62 4
1 2
1 1, 2 2, 3 3,
1 1 1
1 1, 2 2,
1 1
, , ,...
, ,...
dd d
i i i
i i i
d d
i i
i i
E E E E E E
I I I I
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
Before considering any profitable margin, the budget determined within the ROM and 
then according to the contract, is broken down and the allocation matrix of the contractor   is 
B E I   
     . As seen previously, the budget of the sole contractor   is clearly much lower 
than the upper bound of the initial ROM. 
As shown in the appendix A, the decomposition of 
  into permutation matrices, 
according to the Birkhoff – von Neumann theorem, is such that each 
,i lT
  is itself decomposed 
into permutation matrices with the same coefficients as those of the expansion of 
 : 
(51) , 1, 0
N
W W W    
 
        
Still according to the example ( ,i l
  is a permutation matrix of order ld

): 
(52) 
1,2
2,4
3,6
4,3
5,7
6,1
7,5
0 00 0 0 0
0 00 0 00
0 00 0 00
00 0 0 00
00 0 00 0
00 0 00 0
0 0 0 00 0
N















 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
and 
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(53) , ,i l i lT W
 


    
Applying the operators E
 and I
 to 
N
  leads to considering the application of their partitions 
to the corresponding ,i l
 ’s ( , , 1 , li l k j k j d
  
 
    ): 
(54) 
   
   
,1 ,2 ,
,1 ,2 ,
, ,..., ;
, ,..., ;
l
l
i i i i ii d
l l l l ll d
E diag E E E E Tr E
I diag I I I I Tr I


  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
(55) 
, , , , ,
1
, , , , ,
1
!
!
l
k
l
j
d
k i k k j l j i k l
j
d
j i k k j l j i l j
k
k E I E I
j E I E I


    

    

 
 


  
  


   
The   estimate of the budget a  of the department D  for its contribution to the production of 
the function 'ig  (under the design of if ) is then: 
(56) , , , ,
1 1
l l
k j
d d
i k l i l j
k j
a E I E I
 
    
  
 
      
The budget associated with 
,i lT
 is i lE I  in order for the departments D ’s to build the function if . 
This anticipated budget satisfies (according to the initial costing of if ): 
(57)    i l i lE I Tr E Tr I      
Through the same mechanism as the one used for the selection of the participants in the 
industrial arrangement concerning FM , each function if  design is an opportunity for 
optimization through the selection of the relations between the technical components that enable 
to produce ig . So according to the technical policy of the firm which promotes some of its 
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products or developments (the set   gathers the ’s corresponding to this promotion), ,i lT
  leads 
to , ,i l k jT t
      such that: 
(58) 
, ,
, ,
1 | 1
0 0
k j k j
k j k j
t iff
t iff


 
 


   
   
   
Clearly, ,i lT

 involves a solution the budget of which is lower than the anticipated one for 
,i lT
 . 
And it is so for any block 
,i lT
  of 
 . 
Such reasoning applies to any potential contributor   through the enhancement of   
and within the initial budget for building the set of the functions expected by the customer but 
with the functional relations specific to the contributor’s design, to its organization and to the 
way how it delivers the solution to the customer. Rigorously, the structure of this organization 
must be adapted according to the decomposition of 
  (and of all the 
,i lT
 ) into permutation 
matrices, what can be the case for a big contract of a firm to provide one of its main customer 
with high stake services or [mass-produced] products or also when the firm has designed a good 
which requires a specific organization structure for its development and its production to the 
market. 
IV.C. The Industrialization of a Solution Within an Industrial Arrangement 
The matrix FM  gives concrete expression to the negotiations between the customer and 
the firms or the consortiums that are bidding for providing the customer with a solution. The 
expectations in terms of functional relations and the answers by the firms can be synthetized in 
the following condition: 
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(59) , ,0 | 1i j i j
        
As seen previously, the selection of those firms leads to turning the uncertainties of FM  
– associated with the customer’s expectations – into industrial achievement while leaving outside 
the perimeter of the solution designed by the firms, which have been chosen, a part of the 
expected functional relations: 
(60) 
, ,0 | 0i j i j 
      
Let ,i j  be the following set related to the process of selection: 
(61)  , , ,| 1 1i j i j i jand           
Logically for a straightforward profitability, the comparative advantage principle involves 
choosing 
,i jT
 , then    , ,
1 , j
i j k l
k l d
T t

  
 
 
 
and so 
,
c
i j   such that: 
(62)         
,
, , , ,
1 1
min ,
j j
i j
d d
c
i j i k k l j l
k l
H H H E t I
 
 

  


 
     
But this choice, although providing an element of solution that seems competitive and cost-
effective, does not ensure the unicity of 
,
c
i j  within the consortium. In fact if the set of ,
c
i j  is not 
a singleton, the firms that cooperate in the project have to decide which one of the 
,
c
i j ’s will 
actually be chosen. 
On the one hand, this decision is typically a matter of industrial governance and is based 
on the comparative know-how of teams of the firms involved in the customer satisfaction. At that 
stage the governance determination is motivated by ambition, the search of success and 
acknowledgement at the highest corporate level and this determination dispels the doubts that 
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could subsist or arise as regards the outcome of the project or the continuity of the relationships 
between the participants in the industrial arrangement or with their customer. At the stage of the 
bid process, the operators E  and I  have only positive eigenvalues, thus each energy, work or 
adaptive utility iE  and each corresponding information jI  are supposed positive at that time. 
And this positivity is maintained all along the transition between the bid and the project by the 
fact that the contract is signed [by all the stakeholders] and by the governance determination 
which transfers uncertainty to the technical teams in charge of the project achievement. 
But on the other hand, when it is about building the real solution within the contract 
framework, the industrial constraints are such that the decision for the selection must put forward 
the element of solution 
,i jT
  which is sustainable and yielding the least possible negative 
externalities. 
Up to here the budget of the project is under control and proves to be profitable from 
every point of view. 
The decompositions of iE  and jI  are known for the exploratory element of solution as: 
(63) , ,
1 1
,
j jd d
i i k j j l
k l
E E I I
 
 
 
      
In this exploration it appears [on the more or less long term] that terms of these decompositions 
can be negative in such a way that  H   could also be negative although iE  and jI  are 
positive. An easy analysis can establish that externalities are quantified through  H  . At the 
level of a solution element ,i jT
 , a minor default,  
, , ,, 0i k k l j lk l E t I
   and   0H   ,  will not 
necessarily cause a noticeable malfunction with a high impact on the global solution. Such 
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technical issues, when they are known, can be overcome by a “workaround” without preventing 
the solution from being used normally. So the potential externality lies in the fact that this minor 
default involves a little more work to apply the workaround when needed during the running of 
the solution. A major default   0H    is a real cause of problem the consequence of which is a 
malfunction with an impact on the solution that necessitates developing operational measures 
and a specific communication towards the customer so as to mitigate his or her dissatisfaction. 
This case does not constitute a clear externality because the service or good is delivered although 
not according to the contractual expectations nor carried professionally. 
Although it is doubtful that information could have a negative value, it is possible to 
specify that ignorance corresponds to 
, 0j lI
  , efficient knowledge to , 0j lI
   and paradoxical 
thinking to 
, 0j lI
  . Whereas a technical failure can clearly be due to a negligence, 
 
, , , 0i k k l j lE t I
    and , 0j lI
  , it is conceivable that such a failure can be corrected using 
counterintuitive information:  
, , , 0i k k l j lE t I
    with  , 0j lI
  . Furthermore sometimes technical 
components can be used out of their initial range of functioning (
, 0i kE
  ) and so profitably when 
they are twisted  , 0j lI    in order to create uncommon functions. On the other hand malicious 
thinking can be characterized by  
, , , 0i k k l j lE t I
    with  , 0j lI
  : the component is used for 
something it was not meant for. 
Finally when , 0i kE
   for all k’s while using efficient knowledge, RiE  is not delivered at 
the corresponding anticipated level iE  and the default has a high impact on the customer’s 
business and then on his own customers what is an explicit negative externality. In order to 
prevent the solution from such externalities, as in the ROM, framing boundaries can be imposed 
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to  H   as an internal contract, between the project management and the technical teams, 
relying on the requirements coming from the customer and structured into technical ones by the 
designers or architects of the solution. 
But in an always changing world, the evolutions of standards or of practices and skills are 
the main reason why solution failures occur while running a complex system: this is commonly 
what is called obsolescence. In the present case the variety of the firms and their relative 
responsibilities in the production of the solution elements leads to examining interfaces between 
the various contributions in order to express needs of interoperability between those elements 
each of which obeys a different obsolescence cycle. Treating the obsolescence of one given 
component or element can have serious impacts on others and then on the global solution with 
possible failures. So a function provided according to the state of the art at a given time ( 0RiE  ) 
may prove to be a negative externality ( 0RiE  ) after the work of time: standards and regulations 
changes or components outdated because skills for their maintenance are no longer available. 
The conditions of the obsolescence handling are generally included in the contractual 
requirements, especially when the solution running is expected on a long term. 
Whatever the solution characterized by M  each chosen element ,i jT
  has its own order 
jd
 . So building M  , by the replacement of each 1 in M by a bistochastic matrix ,i jT
 and each 0 
by a null block matrix, what involves the uniformity of their orders, is generally not possible. 
Such uniformity could be a first step towards interoperability between the elements of solution 
coming from the teams of the different firms of the industrial arrangement. However even 
through uniform orders, M   is not doubly stochastic, except if it concerns a sole firm which 
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gained the contract with the customer, what refers to 
 . Furthermore the theorem of Birkhoff – 
von Neumann does not apply to M   so there is no rule for its possible decomposition and there 
is no constraint on the internal organization of each firm of the industrial arrangement in spite of 
the macro-organization of the project management  through the set of the  ’s and the selection 
of  ’s.  
The industrialization of a solution within an industrial arrangement relies formally on the 
commitment of each member of the chosen consortium in accordance with the model of a sole 
contractor. Although the development of this paragraph emphasizes the problematic of the 
externalities, it applies to the unique firm which may also have interoperability constraints to 
satisfy at a lesser level and obsolescence to manage. In both cases the chain of uncertainty can be 
followed from the ROM estimate to the technical contingencies and it seems clear that any 
industrial contract is a real opportunity and that profitability depends on the commitment of each 
actor of this chain particularly within a matrix organization. 
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUATIONS OF THE MARKET DYNAMICS 
The equation linking the payoff to the value can be set down within a supply policy: 
(64) sOs s s
s
dP
P V
dm
      
The increase in sP  is due to sP  and to the delivery of the value sV . Os  is a constant 
homogeneous to a capacity that could be positive or negative and which is a reference in the 
chosen frame. 
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V.A. Pure Speculative Zero Value Dynamics 
When there is no creation of value in the chosen frame, 0sV   and: 
(65) exp s Oss Os
Os
m m
P P


    
a) If 0Os    
For the supply, sC and sm are positive according to figure 2, and when 0OsP  , the evolution 
of sP  can be interpreted as an impoverishment of the firm or agent who chose a strategy with no 
industrial value foundations: the farther the strategy construction goes – sm  increases –, the lower 
the payoff. This is the case when theoreticians design a system that cannot be built within a 
reasonable “time to market” and so the designed product will not reach the market. Or if it does, 
when the investment is sufficient, it might be for the profit of the firms which are the most 
financially powerful. 
If OsP  is negative relatively to the frame of reference Os, sP  increases but stays negative. The 
reason for this negativity is not due to the capability of the members of the organization who 
deliver the product corresponding to the payoff. But it comes from their work  'iE s  that 
constitutes a negative externality for the global economy. An extreme example of such an 
externality is terrorism the payoff of which stays negative, whatever the functions used. 
b) If 0Os   
sC  and sm  being positive (figure 2), the speculation is a success whenever it is based on a 
frame where the work can be considered positively: even intellectual positions and design 
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thinking may lead to positive externalities and then to an increasing payoff when concepts or 
strategies are developed. 
Conversely, negative externalities are all the more important since the chosen frame 
determines the [initial] reference work as harmful to the global economy and that the intention of 
harming is reinforced by the increasing number of functions used to this end. This emphasizes 
the risks of growth of every kind of terrorism but also of any escalation of violence, even in an 
economic field. 
V.B. The Equilibrium of the Theory 
The equilibrium is reached when: 
(66) 0sOs s s s s
s
dP
P V P V
dm
         
As established by Nash (1951) in the framework of the non-cooperative game theory, value 
equates payoff in some specific conditions of equilibrium. Chauvet (2013, 2015) used this result 
in the limited context of the basic economic law of supply and demand. 
The equilibrium equation is equivalent to: 
(67) 
1 1
1 1s R
i m i m
s R
i i
i is s
E E
C c

   
 
     
When the designed functions are exactly the performed ones, this equation becomes: 
(68) ss s s
dm
C c c
d
 

      
That is the equation which characterizes the work utility and leads to the graphic expression of 
the law of supply and demand as seen above (figure 4) and according to Chauvet (2013). 
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When sF  and RF  are not totally equivalent, that basic law is slightly modified to take into 
consideration the maturity sM  of the valued product to the market (Chauvet 2015). 
Furthermore introducing this maturity in the calculation of the work utility gives: 
(69) s sus
s
dm c
W
d M


    
The introduction of the maturities for [the demand and] the supply has a serious impact on the 
[mutual] growth of the market but the calculation of K  shows a tricky behavior from which no 
simple conclusion emerges. 
V.C. Out of Equilibrium 
When replacing sP  and sV  by their expressions defined previously, the fundamental 
equation of the market dynamics becomes: 
(70) 
1 1 1
1s s R
i m i m i m
s s R
Os i i i
i i is s s s
d d d
E E E
dm dm dm c
 
 
        
  
 
  
 
      
which is also, most generally and according to the appendix B: 
(71) 
2
1
2
1
0 ;
R
s
i m
R
i
s i
Os s i m
s s s s
i
i
E
Md d
M
dm dm c
E
 
 


  

   


   
The characteristic equation of that differential equation is: 
(72) 
2 0sOs
s
M
c
        
And for 0Os    its solutions are: 
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(73) 
1 1 4
2
Os s
ss
Os
M
c




 
    
Finally, the solution of the differential equation is: 
(74)      exp exps ss s s s s sm m m           
This solution is also written: 
(75)      , , , 0s ss s s sm m m             
If 0Os   : 
(76) 
2 0sOs
s
M
c
        
and 
(77) 
1 1 4
2
Os s
ss
Os
M
c



  
    
The solution is then: 
(78)      , , , 0s ss s s sm m m             
V.D. Dual Approach Within a Demand Policy 
From the viewpoint of a demand policy, the fundamental equation of market dynamics is: 
(79) dOd d d
d
dP
P V
dm
      
The increase in dP  is due to dP  and to the gain of the value dV . 
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When 0dV   , the solution of this equation is: 
(80) exp d Odd Od
Od
m m
P P


    
a) If 0Od   
For the demand, dC  and dm  are negative according to figure 2, the investment always goes 
with a negative payoff, apart from when this demand is made for negative externalities 
consequences, for instance, of a polluting industry (negative work) needing other industrial 
organizations [demand] for cleaning up. If OdP  is positive, in the “Od” frame, that also implies a 
demand for negative work and dP  rises when dm  decreases, what can be understood as a well-
paid getting rid of pollution. 
b) If 0Od   
dC  and dm  being negative, the demand policy confirms that the efforts spent on the market 
are generally associated with a negative – but also increasing – payoff. Here dP  increases with 
the number of functions appealed to when OdP  is negative: the higher the scale of the demand, 
the greater the corresponding payoff. But dP , positive for a negative work, decreases with 
d dm m   when the corresponding externalities – pollution, harmful products or behaviors, etc. 
– are taken in charge by the demand as engagement to clean up. The more is done for a 
sustainable economy, the less the reward to the benefactor. This is the reason why a relevant 
regulation must be enforced by the political powers before any irreparable damage to the 
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environment, in order to avoid the creation of negative externalities and the despondency of 
those who fight against them, when they appear. 
The demand policy and the supply policy are complementary in a speculative thinking, 
although they lead sometimes to conclusions that could be understood as an endless debate. 
At the equilibrium, when the payoff is constant and equates the corresponding non-nil 
opposite value, the demand policy ends up in the same graphical presentation of the basic law as 
the supply policy (figure 4), with subtleties already developed by Chauvet (2013). 
Out of equilibrium, the solution of the equation of the market dynamics for the demand is, 
when 0Od  : 
(81)      , , , 0d dd d d dm m m                
with: 
(82) 
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If 0Od  : 
(83)      , , , 0d dd d d dm m m                
(84) 
1 1 4
2
Od d
dd
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M
c



  
    
V.E.  “Canonical” solutions of the market dynamics equations 
The “canonical” solutions are chosen such that: 
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(85) 
1
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s s d d
s s d d
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   
   
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and 
(86) 1
Os s Od d
s d
M M
c c
 
     
with also 
(87) Os Os Od Od           
and the notations: when 0Os  , Os  stands for Os  and when 0Os  , Os  stands for Os .   
A perfect fit means that the supply curve is exactly the corresponding demand curve what 
corresponds to real exchanges between buyers and sellers with high probabilities whereas no 
intersection between supply and demand curves means that the exchange is hardly probable. 
The figure 7 presents the curves of the canonical solutions according to the following 
characterization. 
The perfect fit of the supply and of the demand curves is obtained for the real solutions 
(a) and (b): 
a) For    s dm m 
   shown as the black dots curve for real solutions with 
(88) 1, 1 . . , 0
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c c
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b) For    s dm m 
   shown as the grey dots curve for real solutions with 
(90) 1, 1 . . , 0
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The perfect fit of the supply and of the demand curves is obtained for the complex 
solutions (c) and (d): 
c) For    s dm m 
   shown as the continuous curve for complex solutions with 
(92) 1, 1 . . , 0
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d) For    s dm m 
   shown as the dashes curve for complex solutions with 
(94) 1, 1 . . , 0
Os s Od d
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s d
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50 
 
Figure 7 – Curves of the canonical solutions  1    
Let   be the gold number: 
1 5
2


  such that 1
1 5
2
 
 
 . 
In the real canonical solutions where , 0s dM M  , the predominant term is  1exp m  , 
while in the real canonical solutions where , 0s dM M  , the term which imposes the behavior of 
the solution is  1 1exp m   . In this second case, there can be an exchange according to the 
intersection with the complex solution corresponding to the same sign as sM  or dM . But this 
exchange represents a very low volume on the market. Nevertheless 
1   characterizes an 
opening to wider exchanges than  . 
Thus out of the perfect fit there is no significant set of points of exchange between the 
supply and the demand except for a nil price or time cost (complex solutions) when there is an 
asymmetry of maturity what corresponds to gifts or thefts or frauds. 
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It is important to notice that complex solutions with maturity symmetry must only be 
considered within dynamics of markets. Therefore oscillations do not provide any information 
about where and when equilibrium occur but simply show that, if there is an exchange between 
supply and demand, it should be found on the complex solution curves. 
A first conclusion about the market dynamics is that canonical exchanges between supply 
and demand can mainly take place, theoretically, when the maturities of the provider and of the 
buyer are of the same sign. But out of the canonical cases, the behavior of the capacities, 
 ,s Osc   or  ,s Osc   for the supply and the equivalent for the demand, prevents from knowing 
to what extent the ranges of the maturities can be decisive in an exchange. 
VI. THE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING OPERATOR 
Decision-making under risk and uncertainty has long been studied from the viewpoint of 
games and gambling. Generally choices are presented in order to fit the formalisms worked out 
to account for rationality. For several decades, the expected utility theory had been the 
mainstream model available to theoreticians for the description of decision making until the 80’s, 
although Allais (1953) paved the way for non-linearity – in relation to probabilities – of expected 
utility, through his criticisms of the axioms of the American School of economics and the 
demonstration of a famous paradox. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed, as a solution to 
this paradox, a tantalizing and successful theory built on their respective and common works 
ranging from Prospect Theory to, more specifically, rationality of choice, framing effects, loss 
aversion, etc. among works of other contributors of the field thanks to whom they could find 
their own theoretical corpus and their need of experiments. 
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But as time passes, whatever the theory, it deserves a few touches in order to apply to a 
wider set of phenomena and to benefit from cross-fertilization with other theories. The Prospect 
Theory reports studies about gains and losses in a monetary and abstract way in spite of a 
rigorous “experimental” protocol involving for instance money managers or graduate students 
from Berkeley and Stanford: “gambling” still seems its only solution to tackle a basic economic 
problem. Nevertheless the law of supply and demand can be called into question in the light of 
this theory, any purchase and sale being also a matter of gain and loss: the purchase is a bet on 
the usefulness of a good or service for a reasonable duration whereas supply is a bet on the 
quality of a product which implies anticipating its utility. The gain to the buyer is a use at various 
levels of need, according to the theory of human motivation of Maslow (1943) and her potential 
loss is any reason for dissatisfaction. The gain to the “salesman” is essentially monetary and 
thus, a means of investing in new goods or services production; whereas the loss is a stopping of 
this virtuous circle. Motivation and complexity are deeply involved in the exchange (Chauvet 
2013) and the success on a market depends also on maturities (Chauvet 2015). The parameters 
that concentrate this information – complexity and maturity – are  ’s,  the solutions of the 
characteristic equations of the differential equations of the market dynamics. 
VI.A. WEIRD Economics 
According to Henrich et al. (2010), the behavioral and psychological conclusions of 
studies practiced on people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic 
(WEIRD) societies, can be questioned as far as a generalization is attempted. Thus, in the same 
way as Allais criticized the expected utility theory, the “universality” of Prospect Theory can be 
consolidated. The graduate students who went through the Tversky’s and Kahneman’s main 
experiment (1992) where all coming from two great universities of California, sharing the same 
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kinds of higher education, motivation, capabilities of complexity [problems] solving and trained 
to behave on high maturity markets but also endowed with a mind opened to punctual exchanges 
with complex market partners. All these features are gathered in 
1 1     when , 0s dM M   
(real canonical solutions).  
The probability weighting operator discovered by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is: 
(96)  
  
1
1
p
w p
p p

 

 
   
This operator is originally designed with 0.61   for the weights of positive outcomes and with 
0.69   for the weights of negative outcomes. On the one hand, these values of   have been 
obtained with only one global experiment and it can be bet that on a larger scale of 
experimentation there would be a convergence towards 
10.618   . On the other hand it 
seems relevant to consider that  , as a capacity of the reference frame, is greater for positive 
outcomes than for negative ones as it has been observed for c  while calculating the value v  of 
an outcome within a project of the firm (figure 5). 
The smooth curves obtained by Tversky and Kahneman for both values of   mentioned 
above can be interpreted as weighting functions, “assuming a linear value function” v , both 
kinds of functions being used in the calculation of the subjective utility of the cumulative 
prospect theory. So it can be considered that these weighting functions are subject to the 
influence of   which can create a deviation from the linearity of  w p  like c  is involved in the 
non-linearity of v . Finally 
1   is a means of eliminating the probability weighting bias in 
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order to obtain 1   and imposes a constraint on the maturities and the capacities of the 
canonical real solutions for which , 0s dM M  : 
(97) 
1s d
s d
M M
c c
       
In other terms, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes showed by Tversky and Kahneman, when it 
is put into the context of the law of supply and demand, relies on a bias involving maturities and 
capacities of the actors of the exchange, those actors being firms’ representatives or decision-
makers or more generally economic agents. Furthermore this pattern applies essentially to 
members of WEIRD societies. 
At first the data had been analyzed through the ratio of the certainty equivalent of the 
prospect to the nonzero outcome in monetary terms and the curves had been plotted showing the 
evolution of this ratio for different values of the corresponding probabilities. In the theory 
developed in the present article, the monetary aspect is taken into account by   while the 
certainty is paradoxically the inverse of the capability of the agents. So the ratio initially used by 
Tversky and Kahneman can be expressed by: 
(98)  
1 d
w p
dm



    
This ratio characterizes the bias which distorts the probability weighting by decision-makers as 
verified experimentally, p  and  w p  being found between 0 and 1. It also shows 
homogeneity: for any constant 0k  , the transformation k   keeps it unchanged. 
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Obviously the reported experiment relies on the equilibrium for the simulated 
transactions to be possible as supposed through the perfect fit of the real canonical solutions for 
positive maturities. 
According to the work utility equation and to the condition of cancellation of the 
probability weighting bias  1   : 
(99) 
1 d M
dm c



     
As max1 p    a logical conclusion is that the fourfold pattern, as a bias, cannot really be 
eliminated, but it can be exploited to find a way towards reality as it is lived in WEIRD societies. 
A simplified version of this pattern may help describe what constitutes a business cycle within 
the framework of markets and eventually it can lead to considering new criteria of well-being. 
The figure 8 is obtained for 
1   and presents the converging series  1n np w p   for 
00 *p p   where *p  satisfies  * * , 0 * 1p w p p   . This figure characterizes the business 
spirit which reigns in WEIRD societies: as low as 0p  can be, the corresponding assessment 
 0 0w p p   shows that the motivation of the agent leads him or her to overestimate the 
probability of an event and for instance to expect a gain for becoming involved in a market or a 
business. This logic of success is maintained at each step n up to *p at which point the agent 
begins feeling trapped in his or her situation what motivates him to change market strategy, 
business or employment. For those who are persevering and consistent with contractual 
commitments, this point constitutes the transition from necessary illusions, essential for 
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beginning and building a business, to the real challenge of doubts facing an agent when this 
business has to be strengthened through a real struggle for a position or a market share. 
 
Figure 8 –  1n np w p   for 
1   and 00 *p p   
According to the figure 9, above *p , any series of decisions relying on 0p  such that 
0* 1p p   shows a decrease in  nw p  down towards *p  what reveals the subjective trap 
which threatens any agent’s hope and motivation to reach a position or a market share associated 
with a high probability. 
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Figure 9 –  1n np w p   for 
1   and 0* 1p p   
Considering the global experiment led by Tversky and Kahneman, an easy interpretation 
could be that members of WEIRD societies are realistic only for certainties  – 0 0p   or 0 1p   – 
or if they are left to their own reasoning while they are involved in an activity which requires 
decision-making, their sense of reality coincides with *p : although reality cannot be reduced to 
a sole notion – as welfare relies not only on an income – it is understandable that what is real for 
a human being is what he or she is motivated for according to various levels of needs which 
depend on any agent. Involvement and motivation imply the will to structure a field of activity or 
a matter which constitute the reality of the agent among all the other agents of a society who also 
develop their own, but sometimes shared, “real world”. So in an environment which is in a 
perpetual evolution, motivation – involvement and will – is, through decision-making and action, 
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the reality of tomorrow and for WEIRD people it can be proposed that it is quantifiable at the 
average level of * 0.34p   at the end of a business cycle. 
 
Figure 10 – Qualitative Business Cycle (QBC) 
Furthermore, the notion of reality is also a compromise between the expectations of an agent 
involved in an exchange and the good or service or money he or she gets from this exchange. But 
the satisfaction drawn from it depends on the initial level of certainty to get the expected product 
and above all on the relative positions of 0p  and *p . 
If 0 *p p , the real probability for the transaction to take place is below the one 
estimated by the agent: the prospect of gain through the exchange is followed by the feeling that 
this gain has a lower perceived value than anticipated. A feeling which is predominant when time 
goes by until the end of the business cycle (figure 10), when *p  is reached, along which the 
agent goes from need expression to involvement in the exchange and then to a relative 
satisfaction that is even less important since the market is known from inside as an easy outlet 
from a probabilistic viewpoint. The bargain proves to be less interesting than expected although 
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it can be surprising by its relative ease. While the outcome of the transaction stays the same 
during the business cycle, the gap 0 *p p  characterizes the subjective loss of value or the level 
of overinvestment. As a consequence, a WEIRD agent who is confronted with this kind of 
situation, knowing this effect by experience, may be hesitant to commit himself in such a 
transaction: he then plays down the highest real probabilities, except 1, and adopts an attitude 
that can be interpreted as laziness. 
If 0 *p p , the real probability for the transaction to take place is above the one 
estimated by the agent: the prospect of gain through the exchange is followed by the feeling that 
this gain has a greater perceived value than anticipated. This feeling goes with the business cycle 
until its end when reality emerges as being a profitable exchange, the estimated probability for it 
to occur being sufficient while the probability of reference is higher. After taking part in the 
market, the agent discovers that through his or her involvement, he or she made a profit – which 
is the product of the outcome by  0*p p  – on the exchange with a low probabilistic 
“investment”. 
The disappointment or the satisfaction has for an origin the natural evolution of markets 
and the feeling of a relatively successful bargain according to the utility of goods or services – or 
to the level of gain –,  objects of transactions, after a while within successive business cycles and 
with the agent’s understanding of his or her relative position on markets. 
Eventually, welfare – or perception of welfare – relies on the mechanism described above 
and settles during successive exchanges thought as being more or less profitable according to 
probabilities for them to take place. So *p  is an indicator of well-being: it is the point to which 
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those probabilities converge in WEIRD societies and at which neutral motivation and 
commitment in a market enable to live a kind of hedonism. 
VI.B. Poor Economics 
In order to extend the Prospect Theory, which applies originally to WEIRD societies, to 
the subject of research by Duflo and Banerjee (2012), the weighting operator can be used also in 
considering the case of negative maturities and corresponding real canonical solutions that may 
be associated with the economic context of developing countries or with “poor economics”. 
So for , 0s dM M   and 
1    the anticipated probability weighting bias is cancelled for 
1   that is to say for: 
(100) 
1 1s d
s d
M M
c c
        
The absolute value of the maturities enables to conceive 
1  as a probability that could be 
reached by the weighting operator within the “poor economics” framework but what follows 
leads to considering that any reality associated with 
1  is probably the one of hope more than of 
an attainable aim.  
When 1  and   , the weighting operator is shown in the following figures where 
'*p  satisfies  '* '* , 0 '* 1p w p p   . The figure 11 illustrates the poverty trap which poorest 
people in the world are faced with. Below '*p , any series of decisions relying on 0p  such that 
00 '*p p   shows a decrease in  nw p  down towards 0 what reveals the more or less 
subjective trap which threatens any agent’s hope and motivation to reach a situation associated 
with a probability below '*p . This poverty trap means that whatever the initial motivation 
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characterized by 0p  below '*p , any involvement of the agent leads to a moral state or position 
where nothing is possible: the Qualitative Business Cycle (QBC) may still apply but at its end, 
whatever the satisfaction, no benchmark against any market perception is conceivable probably 
because of the impossibility of elaborating a market awareness whether it is due to [a lack of] 
education and society running tradition or to adherence to a particular way of life like a “survival 
mode”. What can be interpreted as laziness in WEIRD societies when 0 *p p  may then be 
explained as being inevitability, the main feeling of the poorest when they are trapped into 
poverty  0 '*p p . 
 
Figure 11 –  1n np w p   for    and 00 '*p p   
An intermediate conclusion is that the simple concept of market is the first step towards 
sharing amongst the poorest people a means of building a strategy of exchange of goods or 
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services and thus of growing although in some circumstances such an idea may not survive a 
long time against inescapable constraints or disasters: one strategy is enough to enter a market 
(Chauvet 2013) while creating it by the sole strength of a thought and an intention or motivation. 
In such a situation any hope is an opportunity for the agent to try to reach '*p , the level of 
reality that stays as unstable as a dream which may end in starvation and lack of medical care. 
So the three “anchorage” points of reality for the poorest are 0p  , '* 0.71p   and, beyond any 
dream, 1p  . The first one is reached for more than 70% of the probabilities conceivable as the 
first will of a “poorest’s day”. The second one may be an aim but is unstable and cannot be 
attained precisely except as a result of a lottery draw. 
 
Figure 12 –  1n np w p   for    and 0'* 1p p   
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The third “anchorage” point, shown in figure 12, is unavoidable for most people who 
belong to a country: societies are formed of groups of individuals who obey a hierarchy the 
structure of which imposes the attributions they “deserve” because of their birth or of their 
personal proven value – their work, experience, etc. – or of their election by their fellow citizens. 
Whatever the structure, it generally gives a great place to oligarchies [or castes] legitimated by 
birth, ideology or religion, education, compliance with some rules or laws, wealth, etc. 
Consequently, less than 30% of the [upper] probabilities conceivable as the initial level of 
involvement of citizens from the poorest countries lead to a reality of fulfilment according to a 
business cycle the end of which is satisfaction on a market perceived as such by the privileged. 
So in the countries where the canonical real solutions with negative maturities apply, the 
weighting operator shows inequality and a strong bipolarity of what can be considered as 
realities. 
VI.C. The Systemic Interpretation 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) went into the dichotomy between two ways of thinking, System 1 and 
System 2: “System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control,” whereas “System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that 
demand it, including complex computations.” According to this psychologist, the weighting is an 
operation of System 1. This operation is shown on the figure 13 as the arrow from the abscissa to 
the curve of the weighting operator. 
As Kahneman wrote, “System 2 articulates judgments and makes choices, but it often endorses 
or rationalizes ideas and feelings that were generated by System 1.” So S1 leads to a first 
weighting which is the result of past experiences, and memories of comparable situations, but 
also of biases that affect the agent’s cognition. Then S2 tends to compute a rational justification 
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of this first assessment so as to reach an unbiased position relying on the weighting value. This 
process of coupling of System 1 and System 2 is repeated until both systems “find an agreement” 
at a convergence point which characterizes the mental equilibrium of the agent with the 
corresponding temporary relative satisfaction. 
 
Figure 13 – WEIRD System 1 and System 2 processes 
Naturally, the poor weighting can also lead to other equilibria through contextual 
justifications, the existence of two Systems in the mind being universal and finding probably 
psychophysiological origins in the human cerebral hemispheres specificities.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
VII.A. Conclusions drawn from canonical solutions 
The lesson drawn from the paragraph “Industrial processes under estimates” is that any 
business is worth being developed: it creates or maintains employment, ensures activity for 
providers and solutions to their customers who run their own businesses, what is a well-known 
virtuous circle, the basis of which are exchanges according to the law of supply and demand, 
formalized or not by contracts. That seems evident in WEIRD societies where there is so high a 
density of such exchanges that the markets to which they give a concrete expression are an 
inescapable and well-structured reality, from Stock Exchange and trade to simple shopping. 
Whereas in the poorest societies material resources may be too scarce to generate a persistent 
market awareness meeting the WEIRD standards in spite of other kinds of trade customs, often 
founding a barter economy. 
Nevertheless this statement of fact relies on a model which is WEIRD although it 
represents an attempt at including into the same economic system a great deal of behaviors of 
every kind of society. The canonical real solutions of the market dynamics equations enable the 
description of patterns which apply to WEIRD societies and to the poorest ones according to 
maturities of markets. But the canonical notion leads naturally to enlightening every situation 
that cannot be reached because of too high a complexity level. Thus a first step towards 
complexification is to understand that both canonical real solutions for positive and negative 
maturities coexist in a great deal of countries where all kinds of societies can be found and 
studied, even if some of them are a matter for the WEIRD characterization and others meet the 
poorest reference. 
66 
VII.B. Out of the Canonical Solutions 
The market dynamics model is built on clear principles of value and integrates elementary 
notions of labor time cost, physical work or adaptive utility, capabilities and agent – following 
Sen (2001) –, work utility, capacity and payoff. The concepts associated with these notions rely 
on a formalism the equations of which are completely coherent with one another. But the great 
number of parameters and variables that create complexity and paradoxically enable its control, 
require arbitrary decisions guided by the choice of a mythical mathematical reference: the Gold 
Number. Out of this choice and out of the equilibrium between payoff and value, the market 
dynamics is not really chaotic because other decisions can be made that lead to more complex 
“non-canonical” solutions but the perfect fit between supply and demand remains exceptional for 
finding connections with behavioral economics. Further use of the market dynamics model based 
on computer programs could also bring to light non-trivial conclusions that may not be reached 
either by fast, automatic operations of System 1 or slower, controlled operations of System 2 
mind “processes.” 
VII.C. Exchange, Learning and WEIRD Market 
Any exchange according to the law of supply and demand creates a global capital growth 
provided that it goes with a pedagogical attitude from the supplier towards the buyer who must 
accept to spend time on getting used to the more or less complex purchase he or she makes. An 
exchange comes within a necessary “learning” duration which counts much in the processes of 
growth. This makes education the main foundation of the economic successes. Nevertheless 
schools or universities should not be and are often not the only mainstays of the upper standards 
of societies. They are one of the steps that lead to a life of responsible man or woman whose 
behaviors show a strong involvement in ethical decision-making and action. Ethics is the 
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cornerstone of the consistency of a society and may find a kind of universal way of behavior 
applicable in any economic context while understanding the mind-body duality that 
philosophically governs human decisions (Chauvet 2016). Nevertheless learning ethics does not 
guarantee such universality, physical constitution and mental processes forging unicity and 
rivalries or sometimes developing disabilities (Chauvet 2018) that prevent from being receptive 
to some kinds of education, teachings or trainings and then lead to social exclusion. Inequalities 
amongst people may be basically ethical according to the way they are dealt with in societies 
where values are standardized and behaviors, criteria for the selection of the most appropriate 
candidate for a position. The law of supply and demand is a means for everyone of finding 
equilibrium between needs, capabilities and the requirements of markets. But it is still necessary 
to have access to a market and at least to understand the conditions of a transaction or of a 
profitable exchange of good or service, realities that cannot be permanent or sustainable among 
the poorest people. The role of superior institutions and the person-to-person transmission of 
tacit knowledge through apprenticeship historically explain a part of the processes by which 
Western Europe entered the industrial age while other world regions were showing less 
demographic, technological and financial successes (de la Croix, Doepke and Mokyr, 2018). 
History enables such theses, especially brilliant when they are supported by sound models, which 
confirm the importance of the skill transmission in the economic growth. But those theories are 
anchored in the evolution and can be strengthened while considering that one of their topics is 
the concern of the most common economic law. A functional approach to basic economics 
enables a fine structuring of processes in use on markets: labor forces can be modelled and 
integrated within a capitalistic description of the law of supply and demand for eventually 
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enlightening the deep connections between growth and “knowledge how” transfer associated 
with the trade of goods and services or more generally of complex systems. 
On the one hand, in the light of this study, educational institutions, from the family 
considered as such, to schools and universities, appear as the first places where ethical behavior 
and performance can be rewarded but where education or teachings are only intended to enable 
the creation or the management of a family with love and benevolence, or to be used to learning 
how to learn or to teach efficiently. So these institutions enable to enter the markets of [future] 
husbands and fathers, wives and mothers, or of teachers. Nevertheless universities also trade on 
the knowledge market and, through research and a hard competition for the access to the highest 
academic distinctions, they provide a notable part of the growth of a society in compliance with 
the model of this article. 
On the other hand, the vast majority of the citizens of a country cannot enter this market 
because, like the poorest, they do not even conceive or imagine its mechanisms which are not 
only based on an initial investment, or a kind of purchase, but also on a long lasting effort spent 
on exchanging know-how and inter-personal skills. So those left behind by educational 
institutions get into the labor market with a relative success relying on their capabilities of 
learning by doing and finding in their colleagues or managers’ behaviors a relatively sustainable 
understanding of personal growth dynamics. Their involvement in projects is sometimes the 
opportunity to be trained on new technologies or practices but the less their time cost the less 
they are likely to contribute to a global growth; thus the less they are valued and at the end of a 
business cycle they find them [back] at the WEIRD reality point while they are maintained in a 
feeling of a low profit, if not a deficit, after underestimating the probabilities of a world of 
opportunities. When their time cost becomes high enough to generate growth within a skill 
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acquisition process, while their capabilities are important and so that they progress in a great 
uncertainty, they tend to overestimate probabilities of prospects and to show a high motivation: 
they represent a valuable investment for their employer and they reach the WEIRD reality point 
at which they may have the impression of making a real profit. 
VII.D. The Paradox of the Poorest Capitalism and WEIRD Labor Forces 
In harsher countries and societies which go under tragic circumstances, failures, 
corruption or bankruptcies, this point may be vanishing and replaced by the poorest 
“anchorages”. But such harshness can also be the result of a fierce competition which, although 
generally respecting ethics and laws, is led by these leaders who make of their reality the one of 
thousands or even millions or billions of people after manufacturing devices and developing 
digital media that support their visionary conception of markets. These magnified agents’ views 
have a singular property: they shape the economic world and they quickly become inescapable 
within the necessity of a successful business. Furthermore they crystallize the collective 
imagination of the consumers on sets of functions combined into a single product and in its 
following range while offering solutions to the need that they create. Those specific agents show 
the gap between them and less successful businessmen when the poorest weighting model is 
applied to a capitalistic society. While a few visionary leaders escape from the poverty trap and 
drive their firms towards a reality which is associated with the certainty of a great market share, 
other entrepreneurs fall down to the disappearance of their business. 
Nevertheless beyond the always temporary certainty on a market, any business is subject 
to unknown factors: seminal ideas may be shared or stolen and successfully exploited by other 
visionaries than their originators; patents can be circumvented by a contender for the production 
of more competitive goods; the business or economic model of a service provider can be copied 
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and enhanced by a competitor and so on. Thus the marketing strategies of a firm must be found 
as the equilibrium between official information which is made free for catching the costumers 
and confidentiality of the technical functions, knowing that once the product is available on the 
market, it becomes the property of any buyer who can analyze and reproduce it while elaborating 
and using other patents than those already in force. So in a harsh competition what matters is 
time: time to market, time to deliver, lifetime of an asset and eventually time to obsolescence. 
When leaders work on those strategies, they may have certainties to reach the highest probability 
of market efficiency. If they had not, they would not be able to manage their teams convincingly 
and their transfer of uncertainties to the designers, engineers and project, operation or production 
managers, would not be understood as a source of motivation, involvement and will beyond any 
contractual commitment. So within contracts and tacit agreement of responsibility sharing for the 
success of the firm, the project – that may be led in coordination with other industrial companies, 
possibly subcontractors – is managed under time constraints and taking account of organizational 
and technical complexities in order to satisfy the customer according to a schedule and a budget. 
The matrix formalism enables to trace the initial estimate “down” to the technical achievement of 
the contractual functions and underlines the mechanism by which externalities may appear, 
especially those which are the concern of obsolescence management. The trace followed reveals 
also that uncertainty is transferred from the top of a hierarchy to the technical teams that have to 
deal with possible externalities or obsolescence according to a policy elaborated in agreement 
with the upper management directives. These teams, or labor forces, may be essentially WEIRD, 
even in the poorest but industrialized countries, while their leaders belong to the select few of the 
poorest model applied to the capitalistic society where there can be also poor people in despair. 
But those privileged, except if they break the law, are highly protected by their wealth which 
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enables them to gamble with a high probability of gain, thanks to their imagination, their 
innovation spirit, their knowledge of their target markets and their understanding of how to 
motivate labor forces. 
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APPENDIX A 
Let 
1 ,ij i j n
P p
 
     be a permutation matrix of dimension n, for instance n=3: 
 
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0
P
 
 
  
 
    
P satisfies the following conditions (permutation matrix characterization): 
 
1; 1; ln 0ij ij ij ij
i j i j
p p p p    
  
Let B  be the matrix built from P  in replacing each 1 in P  by a bistochastic matrix ijB : 
 
   
   
   
11
23
32
0 0
0 0
0 0
B
B B
B
 
 
  
 
    
B  is also bistochastic. According to the theorem of Birkhoff – von Neumann B  can be 
decomposed in permutation matrices P  such that: 
 , 1B C P C  
 
     
Where P  has necessary the form: 
 
   
   
   
11
23
32
0 0
0 0
0 0
P
P P
P




 
 
  
 
 
  
Proof: clearly by contradiction. 
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Furthermore 11 32 23, ,P P P
    are also permutation matrices and: 
 ij ijB C P



  
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APPENDIX B 
The equation: 
 
1 1 1
1s s R
i m i m i m
s s R
Os i i i
i i is s s s
d d d
E E E
dm dm dm c
 
 
        
  
 
  
 
  
  
Becomes, with 
ss
m m
  
    : 
 
2
2
1 1 1 1
1s s s R
i m i m i m i m
s s s R
Os i Os i i i
i i i is s s s s
d d d d
E E E E
dm dm dm dm c
  
  
          
   
   
   
     
      
   
  
Where 
 
 
1 1
s si m i m
s s
i i
i is s
d dt d
E E t
dm dm dt
      
 
 
 
  
Whether it is because of the law of conservation of the energy or due to a budgetary constraint (t 
is time): 
 
 
1
0
si m
s
i
i
d
E t
dt
  



  
While innovation is a necessity for the supplier to keep up with the perpetual economic 
evolution: 
 
0s
dm
dt

  
And finally  
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2
2
1 1 1
1s s R
i m i m i m
s s R
Os i i i
i i is s s
d d
E E E
dm dm c
 
 
      
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
The same reasoning applies to work out the fundamental equation of market dynamics for 
the demand. 
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